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Abstract
This paper analyses how the technical and managerial support of buyers affects the performance and investment 
capacity of Brazilian pig farmers. The paper also analyses the influence of the farmers’ investment capacity on 
their own performance and how that performance in turn influences the investment requirements demanded 
by buyers. We developed a structural equation model applied to a sample of 199 farmers including piglet 
farmers (n=91) and finishers (n=108) working under production contracts. The model includes two constructs 
that assess performance – financial performance and production and quality performance. The results show 
that buyer support positively influences both performance constructs and investment requirements for piglet 
farmers and finishers. The relationship between buyer support and investment capacity was significant only 
in the sample of finishers. Farmers’ investment capacity positively influences both performance constructs 
in the sample of piglet farmers. For finishers, investment capacity influences only financial performance. 
Moreover, only production and quality performance of finishers influences investment requirements. 
The results provide buyers and farmers with insights for refinements in support policies and management.
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1. Introduction
Increasing societal and consumer demands, both national and international, towards food quality and safety, 
and increasing competition have led food chains to move from a cost only view to a cost and quality view. 
Facing these challenges, many food chains use complex contracts as a means to meet strict quality requirements 
at competitive costs (Dries, 2015; Gellynck and Molnar, 2009; Key and McBride, 2008; Otuska et al., 2016; 
Swineen and Maertens, 2007).
Several studies have demonstrated that the services that buyers provide in contractual relationships improve 
farmers performance on productivity, profits and quality (Bellemare, 2010; Briones, 2015; Coronado et al., 
2010; Dries et al., 2009; Key and MacBride, 2008; Mishra et al., 2016). Literature has also explained how 
contracts may enable farmers to access resources to make investments addressing transaction requirements 
(Dries et al., 2009; Falkowski, 2012; Key and McBride, 2003).
In Brazil, vertical coordination by means of contracts between buyers and farmers is the predominant 
arrangement to support swine production. Brazil is the fourth largest global producer and exporter of pork. 
Between 2015 and 2019 it produced on average 3.74 million tons of pork per year. In the same period the 
country exported an average of 770,000 tons per year (USDA, 2019). The average shares in global production 
and exports were, respectively, 3.39% and 9.21%. Southern Brazil maintains the biggest share of domestic 
production with 69% of slaughtered heads (ABPA, 2019). Other important regions are the southeast (16.0%) 
and mid-west (14.5%). The main types of buyers are investor-owned firms (IOFs) and cooperatives (Coops). 
These companies maintain slaughterhouses for pigs and deliver pork in the domestic market and overseas. 
IOFs and Coops coordinate more than 80% of the Brazilian swine production. A minor part of contracted 
production is held by mini-integrations (MIs). These organizations use contracts with small farmers to obtain 
live pigs. The main costumers of MIs are other farmers, local slaughterhouses, IOFs and Coops that use MIs 
to complement their supply (i.e. to handle market fluctuations).
In most contracts used in Brazilian swine production, buyers support farmers with technical assistance and 
management practices, credit arrangements and, in many cases, inputs. Through these mechanisms buyers 
also monitor practices and facilities to check their compliance with quality requirements1 (Martins et al., 
2017a; Miele and Waquil, 2007). The production is usually arranged in distinct stages – production of piglets, 
nursery and finishing – and conducted by specialized farmers, resembling arrangements used, for instance, 
in the USA (Key and McBride, 2008; Martinez, 2012).
These vertically coordinated schemes have enabled the Brazilian processors and farmers to adopt modern 
production technologies and force chain actors to improve their agricultural practices and industrial processes 
to meet costumer and consumer preferences (De Barcellos et al., 2011). However, the players in this sector face 
fierce competition and increasing consumer demands (e.g. product quality, food safety, welfare, sustainable 
practices). Such improvements are crucial in enabling the whole supply chain to maintain and enhance its 
access to high quality markets. To respond to these challenges, buyers need to increase their collaboration 
with farmers, focusing on extension services, providing the right quality inputs and supporting farmers 
in investing in production improvements. Therefore, understanding how buyers’ support influences the 
investments and performance of farmers enables chain actors to develop strategies to improve the quality, 
production efficiency and competitiveness of the Brazilian pork supply chain.
Studies addressing vertical coordination in the Brazilian pork chain (BPC) have used descriptive approaches 
to explain the clauses included in the main types of contracts used in this supply chain (Miele and Waquil, 
1  These mechanisms differ from those used by important global pork producers in Europe. In countries such as the Netherlands and Germany, pig 
farmers are independent – i.e. responsible for the inputs and processes used to produce pigs – and contract technical assistance on their own. Sector 
certification schemes are responsible for monitoring quality at farm level and farmers deliver pigs to slaughterhouses through market mechanisms 
(Bahlmann and Spiller, 2009; Schulze et al., 2007; Wever et al., 2010). Therefore, unlike these supply chains, in Brazilian pork chains buyers try 
to directly influence the agricultural practices, facilities and production technologies used by pig farmers.
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2007) and to analyse the alignment between quality requirements and coordination mechanisms used to 
arrange buyer-farmer transactions (Martins et al., 2017a). More recently, Martins et al. (2019) analysed the 
impact of vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms on farmer performance. However, literature still 
lacks studies analysing the impact of buyers support on farmer investments and performance in the BPC.
The present paper analyses, for the Brazilian pork supply chain, how buyers, through technical and managerial 
support may impact on farmers’ investment behaviour and performance. The study contributes several 
theoretical insights. Firstly, the paper analyses how support services influence requirements that buyers set 
during the contractual relationship. Secondly, the paper assesses the relationships between buyers’ support, 
farmer investments and farmer performance using a single structural model. This approach allows for an 
integrated analysis of different aspects concerning the influence of support policies and, therefore, provides 
in-depth insights on how these policies influence farmer investments and performance. Thirdly, the variable 
technical and managerial support includes different items concerning support mechanisms identified in 
literature and used in contracts in the BPC. Compared to previous studies, it provides a much more refined 
set of items which enables more precise identification of which mechanisms may be improved in support 
policies. Fourthly, testing the model in two subsamples – of finishers and piglet farmers – provides insights 
on how different buyer support mechanisms may influence farmer investments and performance. Finally, 
the examination of these relationships provides buyers and farmers with useful insights into how to improve 
and further specify support policies and directions for farmer investments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and the 
hypothesis statement. Section 3 describes the research methods. Section 4 depicts and discusses the results. 
Section 5 presents the conclusions, limitations and implications for theory and management.
2. Theoretical framework
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is the theoretical approach used to explain how chain actors choose 
governance structures (GSs) to facilitate coordination of production and supply. This theory is concerned with 
identifying the GSs that most efficiently align with the transaction attributes – asset specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency (Williamson, 1991).
Asset specificity refers to investments that a chain actor makes to fit specific requirements set in a particular 
agreement. By definition, specific assets lose their value when used in another relationship (Hobbs and 
Young, 2000; Williamson, 1991). In pork supply chains, for instance, buyers that are more stringent on quality 
require farmers to make specific investments in certain technologies (e.g. group housing, acclimatisation) 
and facilities (e.g. sheds, biosecurity) and set incentives for farmers to comply with these requirements.
Uncertainty refers to factors that may affect the performance of the exchange. Transaction parties may face 
environmental and behavioural uncertainties. Environmental uncertainty refers to unanticipated changes in 
external factors that surround the transactions and raise the transaction costs of adaptation and coordination 
(Ghosh and John, 1999; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 2008). Examples of environmental 
uncertainty in the food sector are changing customer requirements and information on quality (Martinez, 
2012), market conditions (Heyder et al., 2010), and public regulations and their enforcement (Ménard and 
Valceschini, 2005; Williamson, 2008; Zylbersztajn and Farina, 1999). Behavioural uncertainty pertains to 
difficulties in monitoring the performance of a transaction party. Monitoring difficulties arise, for instance, 
in transactions in which buyers set quality requirements that cannot be verified in inspections.
The frequency of a transaction is important because the replication of a transaction over time facilitates 
coordination by inducing mutual learning, enhancing reputation and reducing opportunistic behaviour 
between buyers and suppliers (Williamson, 1991).
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There are three general types of GSs under which chain actors may arrange their transactions: markets, 
hierarchies and hybrids. Markets are used in transactions where the attributes present low intensity – i.e. 
relationships in which participants do not share resources and are not required to make specific investments, 
there are no behavioural or environmental uncertainties and the transactions are executed occasionally (low 
frequency). In other words, transactions with these characteristics can be easily coordinated by market 
prices (Wever et al., 2010; Williamson, 1991). In the BPC, a small part (roughly 10%) of swine production 
is delivered through spot markets. In these cases, the pigs are produced by independent farmers complying 
with baseline quality requirements (i.e. public regulations). The main costumers in these transactions are 
local slaughterhouses and middlemen. Big processors may also purchase pigs or piglets in the spot market 
to handle market fluctuations (Martins et al., 2017a,b).
Hierarchies (i.e. vertical integration) are applicable to coordinate a transaction with high asset specificity, 
high levels of uncertainty and frequency. By using hierarchies, a firm exerts absolute control on resources 
and processes that are used to produce goods or inputs. These GSs enable chain actors to handle disturbances 
in transactions (e.g. quality, volume) within the boundaries of the firm (Wever et al., 2010; Williamson, 
1991). In the BPC, hierarchies are rarely used in transactions concerning commercial pigs. Some companies, 
such as big IOFs and cooperatives maintain breeding farms to raise the sows to be used in their production 
chains by the contracted farmers. More recently, some companies are implementing central farms, which 
are totally managed by their technical staff, to cover part of their supply of piglets. This strategy aims to 
increase sanitary control in the supply chain and reduce logistics costs.
Hybrids are GSs used to handle a certain degree of asset specificity and uncertainty in transactions in which 
parties have mutual commitments on resources and processes (Ménard, 2004). Contracts are typical hybrid 
GSs used to arrange transactions between farmers and processors in food supply chains. Through contracts, 
parties establish clauses and incentives related to resources, processes, quality standards and volumes to 
which they commit in a transaction (Wever et al., 2010). Processor and retailers use contracts to control and 
differentiate in quality and to ensure participation in global markets (Dries et al., 2009; Swineen and Maertens, 
2007). Farmers, in turn, enter contracts to handle production and market risks, to safeguard investments and 
to access resources and technology (Dries, 2015; Key and McBride, 2008).
2.1 Contracts in the Brazilian pork supply chain
In the BPC chain actors typically arrange pig production in distinct stages – piglet production, nursery and 
finishing – assigned to specialised farmers. There are two types of farms used to produce piglets – weaning 
and farrowing farms. Weaning farms produce and raise piglets until they reach 7-8 kg. In farrowing farms 
piglets are born and raised until reaching 24-25 kg. Nursery farms receive the weaned (7-8 kg) piglets and 
raise them until they reach 24-25 kg. Finishing farms receive piglets from farrowing or nursery farms and raise 
them until they reach the slaughtering weight (125-130 kg). Basically, chain actors use three types of contracts, 
all including technical and managerial support, to arrange the supply of pigs. These contracts are known as 
‘buying and selling’, ‘loan’ and ‘partnership’ (Martins et al., 2017a,b; Miele and Waquil, 2007). The ‘buying 
and selling’ contracts are agreements used in transactions with piglet farmers that use the main inputs (i.e. 
feed and sows) that they themselves produce or provide. However, these inputs must meet standards that the 
buyers set. The base prices are based on markets. The buyers add a bonus based on the quality of the piglets 
(i.e. weight uniformity). Formally, the volumes that are delivered (number of piglets per batch) are subject to 
short term variations. However, farmers usually deliver regular volumes during the contractual relationship.
In ‘loan’ contracts, the buyer provides the piglet farmer with the sows used to produce the piglets. The farmer 
produces or purchases feed which meets the standards required by the buyers. The main criterion used to 
set base prices is the productivity that the farmers obtain with the sows with which they are provided (i.e. 
number of raised piglets per sow). In some cases, buyers add a bonus based on compliance with quality 
requirements (e.g. facilities, documentation and the piglets). The volumes are fixed for an indefinite time 
– i.e. the contractual term.
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‘Partnership’ contracts are used to arrange transactions with piglet farmers, nursery farmers and finishing 
farmers. In these contracts, buyers provide farmers with the animals (i.e. sows or piglets) and the feed to be 
used in production. Buyers that use these contracts, especially firms and cooperatives, usually maintain feed 
mills and/or breeding farms to produce the main inputs. Therefore, these buyers use their own production 
costs and productivity indexes as references to set (internal) payment prices for farmers. For piglet farmers 
the main indexes are the number of piglets raised per sow and feed conversion. For nursery and finishing 
farmers the main indexes are feed conversion and mortality. Moreover, buyers usually add a bonus based 
on compliance with specific quality requirements. The volumes are fixed indefinitely.
The mechanisms explained above demonstrate how the contracts used in Brazilian swine production fit the 
classical transaction attributes. Buyers such as IOFs and big cooperatives invest in feed mills, genetic programs 
and breeding farms. Farmers, in turn, invest in facilities and equipment meeting specific requirements of 
these buyers. Therefore, contracts are the GSs used to protect the specific investments made by both parties. 
Furthermore, by providing farmers with technical and administrative support, which includes monitoring 
processes and facilities, buyers handle uncertainties related to quality compliance. This control is stricter 
in loan and partnership contracts whereby the buyers provide farmers with inputs. Finally, addressing the 
attribute of frequency, the contracts used in the BPC facilitate coordination by ensuring a regular supply of 
piglets and finished pigs.
As mentioned above, contracts are hybrid governance structures in which participants have a certain degree 
of mutual dependence. To represent the level of control that parties exert on resources and processes used 
in their transactions, TCE scholars use a continuum with governance structures ranging between market and 
hierarchy (Gellynck and Molnar, 2009; Raynaud et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2007). Figure 1 represents the 
continuum of governance structures used in the BPC. Partnership is the contract which is closest to vertical 
integration. Compared to the other kinds of contract, in a partnership buyers allocate more resources that they 
themselves produce and use internal prices. Loan contracts, under which buyers allocate only the animals, 
assume an intermediary position. The buying and selling contract, under which buyers provide only support 
services and use market prices is the least integrated kind of contract. Other GSs used in the BPC account 
for the extremes A very small part of the BPC does not work with contracts and uses spot markets. Central 
piglet farms and breeding farms owned by processors represent vertical integration.
2.2 Hypothesis
Various studies have demonstrated that buyers that include service provision in contracts have helped farmers 
to improve their performance. In the US pork sector Key and MacBride (2008) found that contracts which 
include the provision of high-quality inputs and knowledge improved the productivity of hog farmers. 
Briones (2015) demonstrated that technical assistance, high-technology inputs and credit provided by buyers 
improved the productivity and the profits of farmers in the Philippine tobacco industry. Contracts including 
similar mechanisms have been shown to increase the profits of paddy seed producers in Nepal (Mishra et 
al., 2016). In Europe, services provided by processors have enabled dairy farmers to access knowledge and 
technologies to improve productivity and quality (Dries et al., 2009). Likewise, extension services have 
increased the productivity of fruit producers in Madagascar (Bellemare, 2010). In the Mexican avocado 
sector, buyer-farmer information exchange has enabled farmers to improve efficiency and product quality 
(Coronado et al., 2010). Thus, our first hypothesis is:
Figure 1. Contractual arrangements used in the Brazilian pork chain.
Buying and selling Loan PartnershipMarket Vertical integration
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H1: There is a positive relationship between buyers’ technical and managerial support and farmer 
performance in the Brazilian swine production.
Buyers may use contracts to require their suppliers to make specific investments. Because these requirements 
increase as the contractual specificity increases (Hobbs and Young, 2000; Williamson, 2010), buyers 
may support farmers in their projects related to these investments. In the pork sector buyers commonly 
specify facilities (sheds, structures for manure management and biosecurity) and technologies (genetics, 
acclimatisation) that farmers use to produce pigs. The buyers often assist farmers in obtaining credit for these 
investments and, during the contractual relationship, make regular farm visits to monitor compliance and 
provide farmers with technical assistance (Key and McBride, 2003; Martinez, 2012; Martins et al., 2017a). 
Therefore, this assistance may also include recommendations on investments. Likewise, Dries et al. (2009) 
found that dairy processors in Eastern Europe supported farmers with credit arrangements to facilitate their 
investments meeting (the buyers’) specific requirements on production technologies and quality. Kresting and 
Wollni (2012), found that the use of quality management systems to monitor compliance was determinant in 
enabling Thai producers to adopt the GlobalGap standards. Furthermore, through technical visits or training 
programs, buyers may inform famers on investments that may be required in the near future (Coronado et al., 
2010) based on information on food regulations and developments in production technologies. Therefore, 
one may expect that support offered by buyers is related to investments that are required to comply with 
current and future transaction requirements. Hence, our second hypothesis is:
H2: There is a positive relationship between buyers’ technical and managerial support and expected 
investment requirements in the Brazilian swine production.
Food companies continuously upgrade their standards to respond to food regulations and consumer preferences. 
Moreover, competition on costs drives these companies to source from a selected number of efficient and 
high compliance farmers. Therefore, farmers need investment capacity to efficiently meet buyer requirements. 
Buyers may use different means to improve farmer investment capacity. For instance, providing the farmer 
with a buyer-approved project of facilities to be used in production may facilitate access to credit from 
financial agents (Falkowski, 2012; Key and McBride, 2003). In eastern and central Europe, processors have 
used credit programs and loan guarantees to enable farmers to make investments to improve milk quality 
(Dries et al., 2009). Finally, because the support of buyers improves the financial performance attained by 
farmers (Briones, 2015; Kresting and Wollni, 2012), it may also enable farmers to access resources to make 
investments. Thus, our third hypothesis is:
H3: There is a positive relationship between buyers’ technical and managerial support and farmer 
investment capacity in the Brazilian swine production.
Investments in production factors are crucial to enable farmers to improve performance. For example, Key 
(2013) found that credit access allowed U.S. hog farmers to expand production and to increase efficiency and 
profits. Investments in modern equipment and management systems enabled Swedish pig famers to reduce 
labour costs and improve efficiency on fixed and variable inputs (Labajova et al., 2016). Looking at different 
agricultural productions, Grande et al. (2011) found that financial position was of key importance in allowing 
Norwegian farmers to make investments leading to improvements in market share and sales growth. Lu et 
al. (2010) found a positive relationship between the investments of Chinese vegetable farmers in buyers’ 
specific requirements and their performance on quality. Likewise, Handschuch et al. (2013) demonstrated 
that farmers who could afford the costs related to adopting international food standards improved their quality 
compliance and income in the Chilean raspberry sector.
H4: There is a positive relationship between farmers’ investment capacity and their performance in the 
Brazilian swine production.
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In buyer-farmer contracts, prior to production the buyers specify the agricultural practices and often the 
facilities and equipment that farms must use to meet the transaction requirements (Dries, 2015; Key, 2013; 
Otsuka et al., 2016). During the contractual relationship, buyers monitor processes, facilities, information on 
quality compliance and productivity. Based on this information, buyers provide farmers with advice on how 
to improve their performance (Bellemare, 2010; Bellemare and Bloem, 2018). Thus, it could be suggested 
that buyers may use this advice to require farmers to make investments to improve their production. Thus, 
our fifth hypothesis is:
H5: The lower the farmer performance, the higher the investment requirements are set by buyers in the 
Brazilian swine production.
The following section explains the methods used to test the research model (Figure 2).
3. Methods
3.1 Data collection
Data were obtained using a survey questionnaire applied to 199 pig farmers2 in southern Brazil. The 
companies established in this region accounted for 69.6% of slaughters in the BPC (ABPA, 2019). The 
farmers were randomly selected from lists provided by their buyers. The sample includes finishers (n=108) 
and piglet farmers (n=91) with contracts including technical and managerial support3. The subsample of 
piglet farmers included 60 farmers using their own sows and feed. The other 31 farmers used sows and feed 
provided by their buyers. Semi-structured interviews (n=41) addressed to chain actors (e.g. representatives 
of slaughterhouses, government, farmers associations, slaughterhouses associations, feed stuff suppliers, 
retailers, information technology company) covering topics such as chain coordination, quality requirements 
and performance, were carried out to support the design of the research model and the survey questionnaire. 
The survey questionnaire was applied in face-to-face interviews between March 2015 and May 2015. Each 
farmer answered the questionnaire assessing his/her relationship with a single buyer.
2  A preliminary analysis of the data shows that farms in all contexts vary in size. In addition, a bivariate correlation analysis demonstrated that size 
is not correlated to most of the measurement items used in the model. Therefore, farm size was not included as a control variable.
3  The contracts between buyers and nursery farmers include the same coordination mechanisms used in contracts with finishers. Moreover, in pork 
chains, the number of nursery farms is limited when compared to the number of finishers and piglet farmers. Therefore, to facilitate the research 
design and the data collection, nursery farmers were not included in the sample.
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3.2 Measurement
The research model includes 21 items to represent the measures of the constructs of technical and managerial 
support, investment capacity, expected investment requirements, financial performance, and production and 
quality performance. All measures (Table 1) used a seven-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ 
(value = 1) to ‘strongly agree’ (value = 7). The measurement items were selected from literature and refined 
with information obtained in the semi-structured interviews with chain actors.
As regards the literature, papers were sought on the Scopus, Web of Science and Google Scholar platforms. 
We used key words related to the influence of variables related to contractual relationships (e.g. contracts, 
vertical coordination, buyers support) on farmers’ performance and investments (e.g. investment capacity, 
investment requirements, access to capital). We prioritised studies on contract farming that used quantitative 
approaches to analyse how contracts or services provided by buyers influence farmers’ performance and 
investments. We found few studies examining buyer support and farmer performance and investments in 
the pork sector. Therefore, we selected and adapted various items from studies examining buyer-farmer 
relationships in other food sectors.
The construct buyers’ technical and managerial support includes six items. The first pertains to support in 
credit obtainment. Various studies have made it clear that buyers’ support includes credit arrangements. 
However, these studies do not use Likert scales to assess this support mechanism. Therefore, this item draws 
on studies that use instrumental variables to explain how buyers support farmers in accessing capital for 
investments in the pork sector (Key, 2013; Key and McBride, 2003). The second item concerns feedback on 
information provided by the farmer. Plaggenhoef (2007) used a similar item to assess management practices 
in different food chains. The item also draws on Coronado et al. (2010) who used a construct with items 
addressing information exchange on buyer requirements to analyse the performance of avocado farmers in 
Mexico. The third and the fourth items refer to the organisation of technical meetings and training programs. 
We failed to find any studies that use a Likert scale for these items. Therefore, the items were selected based 
on studies that explain how these mechanisms improve farmer performance (Dries et al., 2009; Maertens 
and Vande Velde, 2017). The fifth item, on technical assistance, consists of the items used to assess farmers’ 
performance in other food chains (Coronado et al., 2010; Lu et al., 2008). The item addressing the use of 
production manuals provided by buyers is derived from the semi-structured interviews.
The construct investment capacity includes three items related to the farmers capacity to invest in the 
maintenance of the farm, requirements set by buyers and those set in public regulations. Studies on vertical 
relationships barely address farmers’ perceived investment capacity. Thus, these items drew on answers 
obtained in the semi-structured interviews and studies that provide insights into farmer investments and 
performance in the (US) pork sector (Key, 2013) and other food chains (Dries et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2008; 
Swinnen and Maertens, 2007).
Studies on contractual relationships, which are related to investments, normally use a variable to indicate whether 
(or not) an actor invests in transaction-specific requirements (Coronado et al., 2010; Lu et al., 2010; Wu et al., 
2017). However, these studies do not specify technical items in which farmers need to invest. Therefore, the 
items belonging to the construct investment requirements drew on the semi-structured interviews. It includes 
four items regarding investments in technologies that chain actors judged as critical for performance in swine 
production – acclimatisation of facilities, animal welfare, sanitation, and manure disposal.
The research model includes two constructs that assess performance: financial performance and production and 
quality performance. As regards financial performance, the items addressing sales and profits are represented 
by measurements of perceived performance changes used in studies on buyer-farmer relationships in the 
Chinese vegetable sector (Lu et al., 2008) and the Mexican avocado sector (Coronado et al., 2010). The item 
on prices drew on statements by chain actors during the semi-structured interviews. The construct Production 
and quality performance includes five items: two measurements related to mortality and feed conversion, 
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which represent important productivity indexes used in swine production and were pointed out in the semi-
structured interviews; and the other items address farmers’ perceptions of quality (Coronado et al., 2010).
3.3 Data analysis
The first step of data analysis was testing the validity of the measurement items using SPSS (SPSS Inc., 
Chicago, IL, USA) (Field, 2013). In this sense, factor loadings were obtained, through varimax rotation, to 
indicate the strength of the relationship between each measurement item and the construct (Table 1). Factor 
loadings above 0.708 are recommended (Hair et al., 2019). However, values around 0.5 are also acceptable 
in studies using adequate sample sizes (Hair et al., 2010). The items BS1 (in the full model and in the finisher 
model) and BS5 (full model) present the lowest values. However, BS1 presents a more acceptable value in the 
piglet farmer model. Likewise, BS5 presents better values in the piglet and finisher models. Moreover, BS1 
and BS5 refer to support mechanisms typically used in the BPC. For these reasons, although we recognize 
that results must be interpreted with care, we decided to maintain these items in the three models.
Table 1. Measurement items.











BS1 My main buyer gives me 
administrative support to 
obtain credit to invest in 
my farm.
0.463 0.66 0.600 0.70 0.331 0.65
BS2 My main buyer gives us 
feedback to improve 
quality based on the 
information we give 
them.
0.554 0.630 0.508




BS4 My main buyer stimulates 
me (or my staff 
members) to do training 
on production practices.
0.734 0.701 0.767
BS5 My main buyer gives 
technical assistance 
whenever I need it.
0.468 0.502 0.512
BS6 I use a manual on 
production practices 





IC 1 I can sufficiently invest in 
the maintenance of my 
farm.
0.911 0.85 0.905 0.86 0.915 0.85
IC 2 I can sufficiently invest in 
requirements set by my 
main buyer.
0.897 0.918 0.886
IC 3 I can sufficiently invest in 
requirements to comply 
with public regulations.
0.822 0.827 0.823
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Afterwards, Cronbach’s alpha values (Table 1) were obtained to test the internal reliability of the constructs. 
Cronbach’s alpha values equal or higher than 0.7 are preferable (Hair et al., 2019). Most constructs fit this 
threshold in three models. The construct BS (in the full model and in the finisher model) and PQ (in the 
piglet farmer model) present values slightly lower than the preferable Cronbach’s alpha. However, these 





ER1 I will be required to invest 
in new technologies 
in acclimatisation, 
watering, fans within the 
next three years.
0.870 0.83 0.838 0.79 0.883 0.86
ER2 I will be required to 
invest in animal welfare 
(group housing) within 
the next 3 years.
0.814 0.794 0.862
ER3 I will be required to 
invest in sanitation of 
production processes 
within the next 3 years.
0.843 0.810 0.851
ER4 I will be required to 
improve the disposal of 






FP 1 My sales have performed 
satisfactorily in the last 
three years.
0.805 0.72 0.845 0.73 0.778 0.71
FP 2 My profits have been 
satisfactory over the last 
three years.
0.877 0.826 0.904
FP3 The price I get for the 
pigs/piglets is normally 







PQ1 The mortality rate on my 
farm is lower than the 
average found on other 
farms.
0.698 0.71 0.683 0.69 0.709 0.71
PQ2 The feed conversion on 
my farm is better than 
the average obtained by 
other farmers.
0.825 0.739 0.860
PQ3 My main buyer is satisfied 
with the quality of the 
pigs I deliver.
0.584 0.633 0.570
PQ4 My main buyer is satisfied 
with the documentation I 
send with my deliveries.
0.552 0.643 0.509
PQ5 I deliver higher quality 
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The hypotheses were tested in a structural equation model (SEM) using STATA IC 14 (StataCorp LLC, 
College Station, TX, USA). SEM allows for simultaneously obtaining estimates for all relationships that exist 
between the constructs included in the model (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014; Tomarken and Waller, 2005). Thus, 
this technique is suitable to analyse relationships between buyers’ support, farmer performance, investment 
capacity and investment requirements. The model fit (Table 2) was assessed verifying the root mean square of 
approximation (RMSEA), the normed chi-square (i.e. χ2/df) and the comparative fit index (CFI). According 
to Hooper et al. (2008), χ2/df ranging between 2.0 and 5.0, a RMSEA smaller than 0.08, and a CFI greater 
than 0.9 are acceptable measures of fit. The model used in the full sample fit these thresholds. The models 
of finishers and piglet farmers meet the required χ2/df and RMSEA but do not fully meet the desired CFI, 
probably due the reduced sample size. This may imply that results on these subsamples cannot be strongly 
supported. However, maintaining these models allows for obtaining interesting indications on how differences 
concerning support mechanisms may influence farmer investments and performance.
4. Results and discussion
This section discusses the estimates obtained in the three models tested in the present study. The model was 
first applied to the full sample (Figure 3) and, subsequently, to the subsamples of piglet farmers (Figure 4) 
and finishers (Figure 5).
H1: Buyers’ technical and managerial support and farmers’ performance.
The results demonstrate that technical and managerial support given by buyers improves the financial 
performance of Brazilian pig farmers in all three models – full sample, piglet farmers and finishers. This 
outcome is in line with studies demonstrating that the contractual relationships enable farmers to reduce costs 
and increase their revenues and profits (Briones et al., 2015; Mishra et al., 2016). We also found, in the three 
models, that buyers’ technical and managerial support improves performance in production and quality. This 
result corroborates Key and McBride (2008) who found that US pig farmers under contractual relationships 
improved their productivity. Studies in other agricultural sectors provide similar evidence (Bellemare, 2010; 
Coronado et al., 2010; Dries et al., 2009). These results, therefore, support H1.
H2: Buyers’ technical and managerial support and expected investment requirements.
Technical and managerial support offered by buyers was found to be positively related to expected investment 
requirements in the three models. This result indicates that support mechanisms such as technical assistance, 
technical meetings and training provide Brazilian piglet farmers and finishers with information and insights 
regarding investments that are necessary to meet the requirements of their transactions. Indeed, in the Brazilian 
pork supply chain, during the contractual relationship, buyers arrange farm visits to provide farmers with 
technical support and check compliance with requirements related to practices, facilities and technologies 
(Martins et al., 2017). Based on this check, the buyer may recommend farmers to make improvements or 
replace resources that do not meet their requirements. Moreover, these buyers normally promote training 
programs through which farmers may gain insights into market and technology developments and become 
aware of investments that may be necessary in the (near) future. We have not found previous studies that use 
a quantitative model to assess the relationship between support given by buyers and investment requirements. 
Table 2. Models’ fit measures.1
Sample n χ2 P (χ2) df χ2/df RMSEA CFI
Full (finishers and piglet farmers) 199 291.473 0.000 71 4.11 0.055 0.910
Finishers 108 292.253 0.000 71 4.13 0.076 0.850
Piglet farmers 91 254.589 0.000 71 3.59 0.067 0.860
1 CFI = comparative fit index; df = degrees of freedom; RMSEA = root mean square of approximation.
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However, this finding is in line with studies indicating that buyers use their support to communicate quality 
requirements to farmers (Dries et al., 2009; Key, 2013; Kresting and Wollni, 2012). Therefore, H2 can be 
supported.
H3: Buyers’ technical and managerial support and farmer investment capacity.
The relationship between buyers’ technical and managerial support and investment capacity was positive 
in the model for the full sample and that for finishers. This suggests that administrative support to facilitate 
credit arrangements and mechanisms used to improve production (e.g. technical assistance; feedback on 
performance) enable these farmers to make a more efficient resource allocation and access resources to 
make investments. As such, this finding is in line with Key and McBride (2003), who found that farmers in 
contractual relationships, compared to farmers who deliver to the spot markets, have a greater capacity to 
make investments in productive technologies. Studies looking at the role of vertical coordination in dairy 
production in eastern Europe provided similar evidence (Dries et al., 2009; Falkowski, 2012).
Contrary to literature (Dries, et al., 2009; Falkowsky, 2012), the relationship between buyers’ support 
and investment capacity was not significant in the model of piglet farmers. Curiously, the mean scores 
(Supplementary Table S1) indicate that piglet farmers perceive their investment capacity as good and recognise 
that buyers provide them with support services (e.g. credit, feedback on quality, technical assistance). This 
may be explained by differences concerning resource allocation that exist under contracts used in piglet 
production and finishing. As explained above, in the BPC, in all contracts with finishers, buyers provide 
farmers with the main inputs. In piglet production, in turn, contracts that foresee the provision of inputs are 
prevalent. However, there are also contracts whereby farmers use their own feed and sows. In the present 
study, most sampled piglet farmers (n=60/91) use this type of contract. Feed and sows are inputs of great 
impact on production costs. Therefore, it may be possible that the farmers’ expenditures on these inputs 
overshadow their perception of how the support services impact their investment capacity. However, further 
research into how differences concerning resource allocation influence farmer investment capacity is needed 
to confirm this assumption. Considering the outcomes obtained in the three models, the hypothesis H3 can 
be partially supported.
H4: Farmer investment capacity and farmer performance.
The results obtained in the full sample indicate that the investment capacity of Brazilian pig farmers improves 
their financial performance. This outcome is in line with Key (2013) who demonstrated that US pig farmers 
who accessed capital to invest in production improved their efficiency and profits, and corroborates studies 
carried out in other agricultural sectors (Grande et al., 2011; Labajova et al., 2016). Unlike previous studies 
(Handschuch et al., 2013; Lu et al., 2010) the results indicate that investment capacity does not influence 
performance in production and quality. In the piglet farmer model, we found that the farmers’ investment 
capacity improves both performance constructs, supporting the literature. However, in the finisher model 
H4 holds only for financial performance (Grande et al., 2011; Key, 2013). This suggests that finishers do not 
perceive that investment capacity influences their performance in production and quality. This contradicts 
studies that relate buyers’ transaction-specific investments to improvements in quality (Handschuch et al., 2013; 
Lu et al., 2010). As explained above, Brazilian finishers are provided with the piglets and feed. Therefore, 
these farmers do not spend resources and time to produce or improve processes to obtain these inputs. For 
this reason, it may be possible that finishers have a greater focus on their financial performance and only 
relate investment capacity to revenues and profits. Thus, these farmers would only perceive the influence of 
investment capacity on productivity and quality if they indeed invested to improve these aspects. Yet, they 
would only invest if required by their buyers. However, further research would be needed to confirm these 
assumptions. These results partially support H4.
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H5: Farmer performance and expected investment requirements.
In the full sample the relationship between expected investment requirements and farmers’ financial performance 
was not significant. Indeed, farmers’ revenues and profits do not inform buyers on areas in which farmers 
should invest to improve their production. However, the results show that investment requirements and 
production and quality performance are negatively related and support the literature (Bellemare and Bloem, 
2018; Dries, 2015; Otsuka et al., 2016). Looking at the subsamples, both performance indicators have not 
presented a significant relationship with investment requirements in the piglet farmer model. In the finisher 
model, in turn, only performance in production and quality was (negatively) related to expected investment 
requirements. Therefore, once again, the results obtained in the full sample may be due to differences 
concerning the support provided under the contracts of piglet farmers and finishers.
Regarding piglet farmers, the mean scores suggest that farmers recognise the need to make investments 
(Supplementary Table S1). Considering that for most the surveyed piglet farmers the buyers do not provide 
feed and sows, it may be possible that buyers are not concerned with the productivity and quality that these 
farmers obtain. In addition, it may be possible that these farmers, compared to those provided with inputs, 
develop more awareness of the investments they need to make. However, further research would be needed 
to confirm these assumptions.
We have not found any previous studies that assess the influence of farmer performance on investment 
requirements. However, the results obtained in the model of finishers suggest that, in the BPC, buyers use 
information on productivity and quality obtained through in-farm technical visits (Martins et al., 2017a) 
to decide on requirements for farmers. This outcome resembles studies on the role of buyers in requiring 
farmers to meet transaction requirements (Bellemare, 2010; Dries 2015; Otsuka et al., 2016). H5 is, therefore, 
partially supported.
5. Conclusions and implications
This paper examined how technical and managerial support offered by buyers affects the performance, 
investment capacity and investment requirements of Brazilian pig farmers. In addition, the paper examined how 
farmers’ investment capacity and investment requirements set by buyers relate to the farmers’ performance. 
The results demonstrate that, in general, buyers’ technical and managerial support improves pig farmers’ 
performance and investment capacity and influences the investment requirements imposed on them. However, 
the results obtained in the subsamples (Table 3) suggest that some influences may depend on the type of 
buyer-farmer relationship regarding, in particular, differences in terms input provision.
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5.1 Theoretical implications
The paper contributes several new insights into TCE theory. Firstly, examining the influence of technical and 
managerial support offered by buyers and the farmers’ performance on investment requirements provides 
insights into the requirements that buyers set during the contractual relationship. In our view, this is a new 
perspective in terms of the literature on buyer-farmer contracts, as most studies focus on investments that buyers 
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Table 3. Results of the hypotheses tests.1
Hypotheses Independent variables Dependent variables Full sample Piglet farmers Finishers
H1 Buyers’ technical and 
managerial support
Performance Supported Supported Supported
H2 Investment Requirements Supported Supported Supported
H3 Farmer investment capacity Supported Not supported Supported
H4 Farmer investment 
capacity 
Performance Partially supported Not supported Partially supported
H5 Performance Investment requirements Partially supported Not supported Partially supported
1 Supported = the relationship is significant at 1, 5 or 10%; not supported = the relationship is not significant.
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set before production begins. Secondly, the paper uses a single model to examine the relationships between 
buyers’ support, farmers’ investments and performance. Most previous contributions used the existence of 
a contract or a type of support service as independent variables to assess its impact on farmers’ performance 
(Bellemare, 2010; Briones, 2015; Key and Mc Bride, 2008; Mishra et al., 2016) or investments (Falkwosky, 
2012; Key, 2013). Moreover, these studies look at the relationships between contracts and performance and 
between contracts and investments separately. Therefore, the present paper provides additional insights into 
the interaction effects of investments and performance and gives a steer on buyers’ support policies.
Thirdly, the study uses a construct including items referring to different types of services. This refines 
insights into support mechanisms provided by buyers as most studies examining the influence of contracts 
and/or extension services on farmers’ performance do not disentangle the independent variables in different 
measurement items.
Testing the model in two subsamples raised insights into how different relationship characteristics may 
influence relationships between buyers’ support, farmers’ investments and performance. For instance, the 
relationship between technical and managerial support and investment capacity and the relationship between 
performance in production and quality and investment requirements are significant only in the subsample of 
finishers. On the one hand, these findings corroborate evidence that buyers’ support that includes providing 
inputs, which is the case in the sample of finishers, improves the farmers’ investment capacity. On the other 
hand, our results suggest that buyers, in their decision making on investment requirements, would only be 
concerned with the performance of farmers to whom they provide the main inputs. To our knowledge, this 
is the first study providing such an insight.
5.2 Management implications
This study raises useful management implications. Improving quality at the farming stage is an important 
step in meeting consumer and costumer requirements and enabling these chains to maintain and further 
access high quality markets. In the BPC, processors usually make large investments and spend considerable 
resources to maintain support policies. This includes, for instance, maintaining a team of technicians, financing 
technical visits and training programs, information systems, and, in many cases, producing and providing 
inputs to be used by the farmers. Improving productivity increases the returns on these investments enabling 
these chains to further compete on costs. Therefore, buyers may further collaborate with farmers aiming to 
improve their investment behaviour and performance.
For instance, piglet farmers who are not provided with feed and sows do not perceive a direct influence of 
the support offered by buyers on their investment capacity. Although further research is needed to confirm 
this assumption, it might be valuable for buyers examining how effective their support services (i.e. not 
including input provision) are in enabling farmers to make investments. Such examination may allow for fine 
tuning these services (e.g. administrative support in credit; technical assistance). In this regard, buyers could 
also consider providing farmers with training, including demonstrating how improvements in agricultural 
and management practices can enhance the farmer’s investment capacity.
Buyers and farmers would also benefit from increasing the information exchange in transactions in which 
buyers do not provide piglet farmers with critical inputs. As discussed above, the results suggest that buyers 
do not use information on farmers’ performance to decide on investment requirements in these transactions. 
However, analysing productivity and quality, and assessing the agricultural practices and facilities the piglet 
farmers use may enable these buyers to refine their technical recommendations. Piglet farmers in turn may 
use these recommendations to improve agricultural practices and decision making on investments aimed at 
enhancing their productivity and the quality of the pigs they deliver to buyers.
In the finisher model, the results indicate that farmers perceive that investment capacity influences only 
their financial performance. Therefore, buyers could consider providing finishers with further information 
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that relates farm investments to improved productivity and quality. Likewise, finishers could increase their 
focus on quality in their management practices. This could especially help strengthen the view on quality 
in buyer-farmer interactions and enhance the performance of farmers and the entire supply chain. Table 4 
summarizes the main management implications for buyers and farmers in the BPC.
5.3 Limitations
The present study is not without its limitations. Firstly, the SEM model tests the hypothesis from a farmer 
perspective. Future studies could include the buyers’ perspectives on how support policies influence farmer 
performance and investments. Secondly, the construct on managerial and technical support provided by 
buyers included only items related to services. However, the results suggest that differences in resource 
allocation matter when examining the relationships between buyers’ support, investment capacity, investment 
requirements and performance. Further research testing the proposed model for differences in terms of 
provision of inputs, using a single type of farmer (i.e. piglet farmer) would provide more refined insights 
into how support provided by buyers influences farmers’ investments and performance (Mishra et al., 2016). 
Thirdly, the study presents limitations concerning the specification of the SEM model. The factor loadings 
of BS1 and BS5 referring, respectively, to support in credit arrangements and technical assistance, are below 
the commonly acceptable threshold (Hair et al., 2019). However, these mechanisms are important and typical 
support services used in the Brazilian pork sector. Moreover, the Cronbach’s alpha of the construct reached 
acceptable indexes in the three models. Hence, we considered it important to maintain these items in the 
model to provide useful insights for improvements in support policies. Other limitation concerning the SEM 
model refers to the subsamples of piglet farmers and finishers that failed to fully meet the goodness of fit 
measures. We recognize that this limitation may prevent us from drawing strong conclusions from the results 
obtained in these subsamples. However, these models provided interesting indications on how differences 
concerning support mechanisms may influence farmers’ investments and performance. Future studies using 
a more refined sampling design may improve both factor loadings and goodness of fit measures.
Fourthly, the sample includes farmers that produce in different transactional contexts (i.e. to different types 
of buyers). Each context has specific characteristics that may constrain the support policies of buyers and 
their effectiveness. For instance, MIs very often use informal contracts in transactions with piglet farmers and 
provide technical support in a kind of ‘on demand basis’. In Coops the relationship with farmers is twofold. 
Firstly, the farmer is a cooperative member who participates, to some degree, in the decision making and 
control of the organisation. Thus, the production contract is an additional relationship covering only the supply 
of agricultural inputs (e.g. piglets or finished pigs). This twofold relationship raises specific implications 
concerning the enforcement of transaction requirements (Cechin et al., 2013) that may also influence the 
support that cooperatives provide to farmers. Finally, compared to other types of buyers, IOFs use stricter 
mechanisms on resource allocation, such as input-providing contracts, in their relationship with farmers 
at all production stages. In this study, the limited size of the subsamples prevented us from controlling for 
differences related to coordination policies in distinct transactional contexts. Future studies could address 
these peculiarities.
Table 4. Management implications.
Chain actors Main implications
Buyers Improvement of support policies concerning investments and performance of piglet farmers.
Strengthening of the view on quality in relationships with finishers.
Piglet farmers Increase of information exchange on performance with buyers.
Finishers Strengthening the view on quality in management practices.
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Lastly, the sample is geographically concentrated in the south of Brazil. In this region small farms – for 
swine and grain production – are prevalent and large-scale systems co-exist. In the mid-west, greater land 
areas and more efficient logistics structures can be found. These conditions enable chain actors to obtain 
inputs at lower costs than in the south. Moreover, pigs are typically produced in modern large-scale farms. 
Research comparing the influence of buyers’ support on farmer performance and investments in the south 
and the mid-west would provide interesting insights for theoretical and management purposes.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material can be found online at https://doi.org/10.22434/IFAMR2020.0124
Table S1. Means in the full sample and subsamples – piglet farmers/finishers.
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